Insight from popular fiction; understanding rather than knowledge by Jones, Todd
 1 




University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
Todd Jones is a professor of philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
He has degrees in anthropology and cognitive science, as well as philosophy.  He is the 
author of the book, What people believe when they say that people believe: Folk 
sociology and the nature of group intention. His research focuses on different views of 
explanation in the sciences and in the social sciences.  His most resent studies have 









      For a number of years, I’ve been studying whether and how people can learn about 
the real world by studying fictional literature. On the one hand, there’s long been an 
assumption that you can. Up until fairly recent times, general education in the Western 
world centered classical Greek and Roman fiction. And I certainly feel like I learn about 
the world from popular fiction.    
      On the other hand, the idea that you can is a strange one, prima facie. In works of 
fiction, you are looking at what happens to certain particular people. The hope is that in 
doing so, we can get general knowledge about human nature. Of course, we learn in 
elementary statistics that you can learn next to nothing from just one case. So how much 
can looking at the rage of Achilles tell us about anger in general? What’s more, these 
characters we look at in fiction are…fictional – how could they tell us about the real 
world? While essayists and even ordinary speakers are constrained to try to tell it like it 
is, fiction writers have no such constraints. In fact, one of the points of fiction is to 
entertain you by giving you a more interesting, dramatic, larger than life version of how 
things are.  William Kennedy, for example, is the Pulitzer Prize winning author of a 
series of books about fictional events in Albany, New York over the past several 
centuries. As a frequent visitor to Albany, I’ve found these books to be a marvelous guide 
to the history and geography of the region. I’ve often lugged the books around to help 
figure out which historical marvel once stood where a strip mall now stands. I’ve worked 
hard to corroborate what’s in the book with historical sources. I once had the pleasure of 
meeting Mr. Kennedy at a book signing and at the question and answer session, I asked 
him what he thought it was and wasn’t permissible to alter in fiction. “In fiction,” he told 
me, “you can change anything.”  
      So I’ve been writing about this puzzle for years. And I’ve argued that you can get 
knowledge from fiction, but it’s much harder to do so than people think. Knowledge is 
traditionally defined as “justified true belief.”  Now fiction can often give us beliefs, but  
by itself, fiction doesn’t give us a justification for those beliefs – so it doesn’t,  by itself,   
give us knowledge.  Yet one way that you can get knowledge from fiction is through a 
process I call “fiction suggests, real world attests.”  In this process, we may pick up 
beliefs about the real world from reading fiction, but none of the justification for those 
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beliefs comes from the fiction. The justification comes from elsewhere. For example, 
Caleb’s Crossing is a novel by Geraldine Brooks about the life of Caleb 
Cheeshahteaumuck, the first Native American to graduate from Harvard. Having read the 
novel, I now believe that in colonial New England, many towns were destroyed in 
fighting between settlers and Native Americans, that Harvard originally had an “Indian 
School” attached to it, and that the Puritans often drank small beer for breakfast.  But if I 
now know (rather than just believe) these things, I didn’t come to know them upon 
completing the novel. I came to know them when, after the novel whetted my curiosity, I 
looked up various things that experts had written about these details.  I came to know 
these things via 1) the novel creating a number of suppositions, and 2) my then coming to 
find many were true through evidence from outside of the text.   
      I’ve argued that this is a good way of getting knowledge from fiction. The problem is 
that most people never do the second step. They don’t bother to look up or investigate 
other sources to find whether the beliefs they form from reading fiction are true.  
      There are also other “short cut” methods of gaining knowledge from fiction. One of 
these is by reading a work of fiction and then using an argument from analogy to draw a 
conclusion about the real world. A standard way of reasoning by analogy about anything 
is to start with the observation that some familiar sample item and a lesser-known target 
each have a set of properties (call them wxy) in common.  We know that the sample also 
has some other property (call it Z) that has some (unspecified) lawful connection with 
properties wxy.  We don’t think there are significant differences that would make the 
target item different in the relevant respects, so it stands to reason that the target will have 
property Z too.  
     Regarding fiction, we might reason by analogy, to come to know things about the 
world in ways like the following:  Jumpa Lahiri’s book The Lowlands contains a detailed 
fictional account of radicalism in India in the 1970s. When one compares the activities 
happening in Lahiri’s account with the historical record, they seem to match remarkably 
well. So we have good reason to think that the sample (Lahiri’s fictional Indian political 
radicals) and the target (actual Indian political dissidents) are very similar in many ways. 
Straightforward analogical reasoning gives us reasons to believe they must be similar in 
other ways. Now Lahiri’s book implies it was not unusual for Indian police sometimes to 
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summarily execute political dissidents. Given that the reality and the fiction are similar in 
other ways, it stands to reason that they are similar in this way too.  Perhaps we should 
thereby conclude that police did sometimes perform summary execution of political 
dissidents in the 1970s. 
     Reasoning by analogy this way has many nice features.  Unlike with extra-textual 
confirmation, the fiction itself gives one a fair amount of evidence that the claim about 
the real world is true.  The more the work of fiction gives us evidence that it is like the 
real world we want to know about, the more we will be justified in thinking that other 
features that are there in the fictional world will also be there in the real world.  Unlike 
with necessary truths, we are not limited to learning about features that are true in all 
possible worlds.  Analogies are able to tell about things that are true in highly particular 
situations – here, in highly particular fictional situations and similar real-world situations.   
The features might be very concrete, like what people tended to eat for breakfast in 
particular regions and times, or they can be highly abstract, like the type of courage 
certain sorts of people display.    
     I suspect that people pick up ideas from fiction by reasoning by analogy this way all 
the time.  They see things happen in a fictional sample. They see that a realm of the real 
world closely resembles the fictional sample in many features, and so they assume that 
the real-world situation will resemble it in not-yet-seen features as well.  I, myself, seem 
to have been reasoning by analogy this way when campus police came to my office to 
investigate a bicycle that had been stolen from there.  As they went to leave, I asked if 
they were going to dust for fingerprints. I likely asked this because this is how I’d seen 
burglaries investigated on fictional TV crime shows.  
       But a problem with reasoning this way is that the conditions required for a good 
inductive conclusion by analogy are very hard to meet (especially for the kind of 
analogies we are interested in here). In my burglary situation, the police were somewhat 
amused at my inquiry about fingerprints, because, unlike the investigations in analogous 
fictional burglaries I had in mind, these real police rarely did fingerprint dusting.  One of 
the problems is that between almost any two mildly complex situations there are 
numerous differences as well as similarities.  Differences make any analogy weaker.  The 
number of differences existing between even any two actual situations is so great that 
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Alex Rosenberg (2011), in an interesting book chapter titled “History Debunked,” argues 
that almost no historical situation can really give us much information about what to 
expect from analogous situations. And the differences between any given real situation 
and an analogous fictional situation that one is reasoning from are likely to be at least 
equally great. Indeed, there are many reasons they are likely to be greater. The people and 
situations described in fiction have to be more striking, interesting, and dramatic than real 
ones for fiction to hold our interest.  And even if authors are trying hard to create realistic 
worlds, having an accurate detailed comprehensive knowledge of the real world is no 
easy matter.  And fiction writers are not required by anyone to have the level of 
knowledge and expertise about any particular realm that social and natural scientists do.  
So Conan Doyle could write a Sherlock Holmes story in which the villain was a snake 
trained to follow whistles – without having to check if this is possible. (It isn’t.) George 
Bernard Shaw could write Pygmalion assuming a psychological fact about opposites 
attracting. (They don’t – ask the researchers at dating site companies who make matches 
for a living.) A novelist who creates a gripping story about a paranoid schizophrenic 
might or might not know things that a typical psychologist treating schizophrenics does. 
A reader of this novel who notices that many features of the main character match those 
of the brother of a friend could easily come to all kinds of faulty conclusions about how 
the brother is thinking, by assuming that he’s likely to think like the analogous character 
in the novel.  
   There are many prima facie reasons, then, to worry about whether fictional situations 
that seem similar on the surface to real ones really have enough similarities and few 
enough differences to warrant believing certain things about the real world because of 
what is there in the fiction (see also O’Neil 1986). These worries could be overcome, 
however, if we could look carefully at the two cases to see that, unlike what is often the 
case, they are actually very similar.  The similarities between the situation in the fiction 
and the complementary situation in real life might be so numerous that we have good 
reasons to expect that other features that we see in the fiction will be there in real life as 
well.    
     But this is something that’s actually very difficult to know.  First, it’s often hard to 
know what exactly is and isn’t there in the fictional world (including possible differences 
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from real-world situations) on the basis of the verbal descriptions provided by authors.  
More problematic, however, is that we seldom know enough about the real-world 
counterpart to the fictional situation to know how similar it is, or whether it contains 
numerous dissimilarities. Are Lahiri’s fictional Indian clandestine radicals really like the 
ones existing then?  To know, I would have to know a lot about India in the 1970s.  Are 
Brooks’s Wampanoag really like the historical ones of the 17th Century?  If the fictional 
ones took hallucinogens, does that mean the real ones did?  I discussed Brooks’s case 
earlier in the context of extra-textual confirmation, because nothing in my background 
knowledge could tell me whether the fictionalized Wampanoag were similar enough to 
the real Wampanoag for me to be able to use this similarity as a basis for a warranted 
analogical inference. I did not know enough about the actual Wampanoag. This is the 
typical situation we find ourselves in when reading fiction. We might sometimes read 
about situations we already do know a lot about.  But the more we know, the less new 
there is for the fiction to tell us about. We typically learn when we get information about 
exotic realms that we know relatively little about. But the more exotic the world we are 
reading about is, the less we know about its real-world counterpart, and the harder it is to 
tell if the two are really highly analogous.  
    Seeing that various scenarios in fictional worlds seem very like those in the actual 
world invites us to reason analogically. Schoolyard bullying in a work of fiction might 
seem so similar to incidents of playground bullying going on in a nearby playground that 
we naturally come to think that the two situations must be alike in additional ways. If the 
bully in the fiction bullies out of a deep sense of insecurity, then it is easy to think this is 
true of today’s typical schoolyard bullies (even though lots of evidence indicates that it is 
not). Analogical reasoning comes naturally to us, and when the conditions for a good 
analogy are met, we can use such reasoning to make good justified inferences. It is 
possible for fiction to teach us things through analogical reasoning. But if we want to 
come to good conclusions this way, we need to be cognizant of how hard it is for 
comparing real and fictional worlds to meet these conditions.  
        Now I’ve been making these points in talks for years, but I rarely been able to 
convince anyone. Recently I’ve come up with a new diagnosis of why people are 
unconvinced. I think that when I argue that it’s really difficult to use fictional literature to 
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gain knowledge from fiction, they believe that I am also arguing that we can’t get 
understanding from fiction.  
         But these are two different claims. I stand by arguments that it’s really hard to get 
knowledge from fiction. But I also think that it’s much easier to get understanding from 
fiction. Let’s see if I can make clear what the difference is.  
       Traditionally, to get knowledge of something, you need three things: belief, truth,  
and justification. In ordinary life we often easily get all three. Consider perception. When 
we look at an intersection in normal light and form the belief that “a blue car is stopped at 
that traffic signal,” our belief is justified if we have no reason to think our perceptual 
abilities aren’t up to snuff.  Or consider certain types of testimony. If a friend you know 
to be trustworthy tells you that Thomas Jefferson owned slaves, you can justifiably 
believe that Jefferson most likely owned slaves, since there is a presumption of truth-
telling between friends. If you know your friend is an expert in history, then you have 
even more reason to believe this is a fact. Reading fiction is not like this. If we read a 
story in which the police burn a suspect they are interrogating with cigarettes, and form 
the belief that police sometime burn suspects, such a belief is not immediately justified.  
Testimony and perception are processes designed to give people true beliefs. But that is 
not the primary function of fiction. Without more evidence, we don’t have good reasons 
to believe that the events and circumstances in the fictional world tell us about things that 
are true in the actual world. 
Fiction writers can write what they want about particular or general situations 
without it having to be true and without it having to be justified. (And even if they did 
give justifying evidence – that could all be made up.)  So to get knowledge from fiction,  
readers end up having to do the difficult things I’ve argued in my papers that you have to 
do. And hardly anyone ends up doing it.  
           But understanding is different from knowledge. For a representation to enhance 
your understanding, all it has to do is be a mostly true representation. Among the clearest 
and simplest parts of the concept of understanding is that whenever we increase the 
number of (true) properties of X that are mentally represented (without a decrease in true 
properties represented elsewhere), then we increase our understanding of X.  If you read a 
fictional novel about the Irish Potato Famine and the description gives you a true picture 
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of what the famine was like, then you do understand the famine pretty well.  And 
understanding is always a matter of degree; basically, the more true features of a situation 
you represent, the better understanding of it you have.  
      So you can’t say you have knowledge about the potato famine. You have lots of extra 
work to verify that the beliefs picked up from the novel are justified. If you don’t do the 
extra work, you don’t have a justification of your beliefs and you don’t have knowledge. 
But for understanding, as long as you have a representation of a situation where the 
features the fiction has led you to represent as being there, really are there – it doesn’t 
matter if you are justified or not, you have an understanding of the situations. If you read 
historic novels about these or those historical events and they depict those situations 
accurately, you have an understanding of those events – even if you don’t have 
knowledge of them. The same thing is true about more general abstract ideas you might 
pick up from a novel. (For example, you might come to understand things about human 
resilience.)  
       What’s more, when the idea is in story form, you’ll probably understand it better 
than in when it’s in non-story form because you’ll pay attention to it more and you’ll 
remember it better. People will be prone to especially remember certain types of 
information for many of the same reasons they are prone to pay attention to it. We benefit 
from caring about agents’ problems and how they resolve them using their beliefs and 
desires. We also very much benefit from knowing when, in a sequence of events, things 
(and things like them) tend to happen. Watching what generally happens in sequences of 
events is how we begin to make rough predictions about what will happen. We can do 
this even better if we come to see things in terms of certain sequences of causes. If we 
can get information about causal sequences and causal dispositions, this is information 
we are probably disposed to remember especially well. Increased representation of 
something’s properties in memory by itself enhances understanding. But increased 
representation of causal properties likely especially enhances understanding because 
causal properties are among our most heavily weighted properties in our calculus of how 
well something is understood. Causal information is one of the things that stories are 
particularly well set up to give. Not all causal sequence information is a story. But all 
stories, according to most narrative theories, consist of sequences of events linked 
 9 
together causally. If a story is giving us true information about what kinds of things tend 
to cause other things, then it’s likely giving us both highly memorable information 
(which inherently enhances understanding) and the kind of information that we think 
most contributes to enhanced understanding.   
     A highly plausible theoretical view of how one should expect attention and memory to 
work, then, suggests that stories would be an especially good way to increase our 
representation of the properties of things to enhance our memory (and, correspondingly, 
our understanding) of them.  And decades of empirical research show that the appearance 
of properties in stories about things does, in fact, enhance our ability to remember them.  
A classic study showing this was published in 1969 by Bower and Clark. It showed that 
subjects remembered twice as many random words when the words were embedded in a 
narrative structure than when they were embedded in another kind of structure. Graesser 
and Ottati (1995) describe the result of many empirical studies as showing that narratives 
have an especially “privileged status” in human cognition. There are, then, good reasons 
to think that putting things in story form might well help people remember, subsequently 
represent, and hence understand something’s properties 
      So I think the reason people have been resisting me all these years is that they think 
having their students pick up information from stories increases their understanding of 
the subject matter. And that’s true. And they think when I say it’s hard to learn (in the 
sense of gaining knowledge) from fiction, I’m denying something that’s obvious. I’m 
hoping I’m making clear today that I do agree students can learn and learn better from 
information in a story form. What I deny is that it’s easy to get knowledge this way.  
      Now in some ways understanding is just as important as knowledge--sometimes even 
more important.  So let me be on the record that (despite what people think I’ve been 
saying) I think that fictional stories can be a really good way to give people 
understanding of the world.  
      Now I suppose I wouldn’t be a good academic if I didn’t give a little bit of a caveat to 
what I’m saying. For all that stories can do for increasing people’s understanding of the 
real world, there are a couple of downsides to them. I’ll talk about the most important 
one. One vital feature of the story form is that being a story consists of being a sequence 
of particular events. An account of the events in a specific bank robbery, real or fictional, 
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is a story. A set of statements describing the general techniques by which banks are 
sometimes robbed is not. When people use a story to teach people about something, they 
usually do so in the hopes that people will make generalizations about the kinds of events 
and people in the story. If the listeners don’t do this, it will be difficult for them to use the 
story to tell them about anything other than the specific situations of the characters in that 
particular story. That’s usually not the main thing teachers want their students to know 
about. They want students to apply lessons from the story to their own lives and the 
world they live in.  Teachers don’t so much care about their students knowing how many 
“soma holiday” drug trips Lenina takes in Brave New World.  They want their students to 
think about whether this kind of living would be good for people like themselves. If not, 
what does that say about hedonic consequentialism as a general moral philosophy?  But 
which generalizations story readers will make, is a complex matter. General claims are 
often not there in a story itself. The particular events in a story are like the “raw data” of 
real life. Stories are not like essays, which are often full of general claims and arguments 
for them. Readers will have to make abstract categorization judgments themselves in 
order to apply the lessons from the story to other situations. As these (usually non-expert) 
readers do so, numerous potential problems arise that don’t arise to the same degree when 
the claims presented are already more abstract and general.   
       The problems begin with the fact that there are innumerable different generalizations 
that story consumers might make from the same particular events they see, hear about, or 
read about. To use a simple example, for clarity’s sake: Suppose someone reads a story in 
which a tourist gets mugged in Boston by a guy wearing a Red Sox hat and an earring.  
People, like most higher organisms, are prone to making generalizations about what 
happens (see Shepard1987).  There are various generalizations readers might begin to 
inadvertently make. If they focus specifically on the Red Sox hat, there are various 
different dimensions of similarity along which they might construct a generalization. The 
hearer might possibly think that, while in America, he would be in danger of being 
mugged by people who are wearing various sorts of headgear – helmets, kerchiefs, 
bowler hats, etc.  On the other hand, he might think he is endangered by wearers of red 
garments of various sorts. He might think that the presence of baseball paraphernalia 
signals a danger. People carrying ball gloves, bats, or sports pages could now be thought 
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of as a threat. Alternatively, he might ignore the hat and focus on the earring – and then 
things similar to the earring. And, for any of the features he initially focuses on, he might 
think of larger or smaller superordinate categories. If he thinks of the assailant as a 
Bostonian, he might fear traveling to Boston on his next vacation. Or he might worry 
about Massachusetts, or New England, or the Northeast, or the United States. Out of all 
these possibilities, only a very small number of the generalizations are ones that a teacher 
presenting the story to him is likely to want him to come to, upon reading a certain 
passage.  
     While it’s hard to know what generalizations a given individual or group of readers is 
likely to come to, we can safely say that a good many of the generalizations will likely be 
overly narrow or overly broad.  After watching the video of George Floyd’s killing, a 
repulsed viewer might come to think: 
 
Middle-aged Minnesota police officers are a danger to Black people. 
Minnesota police officers are a danger to Black people.  
Rogue police officers are a danger to Black people.   
All police officers are a danger to Black people.  
All white people are a danger to Black people. 
 
And for any of these subjects they might have wider or narrow predicates, such as:  
Police officers- 
are inclined to arrest Black people. 
are a danger to Black people.  
are inclined to kill Black people. 
are inclined to kill Black people by suffocation. 
  are a danger to all non-white people. 
 
As with a story, the particular events a person has seen on the tape don’t contradict any of 
these generalizations. Indeed, without more information, the videotape is a confirmation 
of all of them.  All of them are generalizations that watchers of the tape could come to.  
Not all of them, however, are the generalizations others might think they should come to.   
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We never know which ones they pick up.  And odds are pretty good that they will make 
ones we don’t want them to have.  
     Note that, while in the examples I’ve discussed, even the abstract beliefs are fairly 
concrete, the same point holds regarding highly general “meaning of life” type claims. A 
general abstract claim like Sartre’s “Man is nothing but his plan” can be overly general or 
overly narrow, just as more concrete claims can be.   
      What can be done about this problem? In creative writing, there’s a bias against being 
clear about the generalizations. Writers are taught to “show, don’t tell” and not to be too 
“preachy.”  That might be good advice for creative writers. But as teachers, people trying 
to make sure people have an understanding of the world, we shouldn’t have that bias.    
Steering people toward the generalizations we believe are important that they pick up is 
something we should do.  
         The main points I hope you take away from this paper then are: 
1. Fictional works seldom give us knowledge of the real world. 
2. But they can and do often give us a good UNDERSTANDING of the real world.  
3. To help fiction give us an understanding of the real world, it helps if teachers 
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